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Article 2

THE CONSTITUTION AND STATE RIGHTS
.By PAUL M. BuTLER
"Government was made for the people, not the
people for government.-PresidentJohn Tyler

In a political age marked by a most paternalistic tendency
on the part of the federal government of the United States, arises
another of many questions that go for their solution to the very
foundation of the Constitution of the United States, to the very
principle upon which that lasting document was based,--the
formation of a more perfect Union in which both state and federal governments would be confined to their respective domains.
The precise question that has been presented to the student
of political science and constitutional jurisprudence that involves
a consideration of state rights is whether the Senate of the United
States Congress has the right to nullify the action of a sovereign
state in the selection of-its representatives in the Senate. Such
was the controversy that arose when the credentials of Senatordesignate Frank L. Smith of Illinois and Senator-elect William
S. Vare of Pennsylvania were presented to, and summarily rejected by the upper house of the national legislature.
The primary theory of government, as defined in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence, i. e., that the government
derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, and the
constitutional provisions that relate to he representaion of he
sovereign states in the legislative branch of the federal governmeht are essentially important in a consideration of this question that strikes as a menace to the rights of the sovereign states
to representation in Congress.
Governments depend for their continued existence upon the
people and their submission to a reasonable infringement upon
their natural rights for the sake of law and order. That government in any form proceeds from the people is a principle that
seldom has been controverted in all the history of the world.
That these primary ideas of government and its source were
not lost sight of by the .framers of the Constitution is evidenced
by their own monumental contribution to the creation of a free
government for a free people, namely, the Constitution itself.
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In the first step towards the uninfication of the colonial
states, i. e., the preparation of the Articles of Confederation,
adopted by the Continental Congress in 1777, and subsequently
ratified by the thirteen original states, their declarid purpose
was to provide for the common defense of the states, the security
of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare. To
secure those ends, the states delegated certain of their powers
and rights, conferred upon them by the governed, to the. federal
government, and a few years later, upon the failure of the confederation the Constitution of the United States, in which the
powers granted to the national government and those retained
by the states, and the restrictions upon each are alike set forth.
The .states, therefore, are clearly not creations of the national
government; on the contrary,--an existing authority of enumerated or delegated powers, as contradistinguished from the reserved powers of the states.
The framers of our great Constitution, doubting its efficacy,
as did Franklin, "unless- it was, like a pyramid, broad based
upon the vill of the people", therefore constructed the Union
upon a dual form of representative government, thereby making
an unique contribution to political- science, and by certain express and implied provisions guaranteed to, and reserved for the
sovereign states certain rights and powers.
Among those rights held by the several states in the federal
government was the all-important right to representation in
both houses of the national legislature,--the Senate and the
House of Representatives. It was during the constitutional
convention that a conflict arose among the delegates in regard
to the equality of representation of the small states with the
more thickly populated colonies, and reached its solution in one
of the most famous of the several constitutional compromises,
whereby there was to be equal representation in the Senate for
all states, and representation in the house "apportioned among
the several states according to their respective numbers-."
(Article I, Section 2, (3), amended by Article XIV of the Amendments.)
In other words, the Senate was the representative body of
the states, and the House of Representatives was, by virtue of
the apportionment of its members, the representative body of
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the people. As a result of this far-reaching compromise, we
find in Article V the provision the "--no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate".
The action of the Senate in refusing to accept into their body
the men duly elected and chosen by the people of the sovereign
states of Pennsylvania and Illinois, resolves itself into this precise quest ion: "Did not the Senate exceed its constitutionally
granted powers and did it not deprive these states of their equal
suffrage in that branch of Congress ?"
The ground upon which the senate based its conclusion in
the case of Senator-designate Frank L. Smith was that his primary campaign had been tainted with corruption and putresence,
and that as a result he was therefore disqualified as a Senatorelect from the State of Illinois, to present to the Senate ,or to
have presented to the Senate for him, credentials of his election
(Senate resolution 291-December 9, 1926.)
In the constitution Article 1, Section 3, (3), we find this pertinenet provision: "No person shall be a Senator who shall not
have attained the age of thirty years, and has been nine years a
citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an inhabitant of the State for which he shall be chosen," and,
again, in Article 1, Section 5, (1) "Each house shall be the
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own
members,--"
The case presents to the constitutional jurist a delicate question of the interpretation of the latter section in the light of the
former, which definitely stated the three affirmative qualifications of age, citizenship, and state residence. Does Article 1,
Section 5, (1), in stating that each house shall judge the qualifixations of its own members, limit each house to those specific,
enumerated qualifications of the Constitution, or does it imply
the power to each house to inquire into the further qualifications
of its members and reject a number on the grounds other than
those set forth in Section 3? In other words, is the word "qualifications", appearing in Section 5, a word of limitation, restricted
to the qualifications of Section 3, or is it a word of broader meaning, not referring to the technical requirements set forth by the
Constitution for the members of both houses of Congress?
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The views and opinions expressed during the controversy by
many senators on the floor of the senate and by sfveral prominent constitutional lawyers are wholly divergent and utterly
beyond reconciliation, there being two different conclusions
based upon the same, common grounds.
The conclusion reached by a great majority of the members
of the Senate was that it possessed the right to refuse admission
to any person sent by the people of a sovereign state to represent
them on the ground that the Senate was the judge of the qualifications of its own members, and that there was other qualifications to be considered in addition to the requirements as to age,
citizenship and residence.
On the other hand, a large number of very able-minded
Senators maintained that such a denial by the Senate to accept
the representative of a sovereign state was an abuse of power by
the Senate, a danger to state sovereignty, and a direct nullification by the Senate of the act of the people of the state of Illinois
in the selection of their own ambassador, to the upper house of
Congress,-in short, that is violated the fundamental principles
of the constitution.
It was argued by those Senators opposed to the seating of
the Illinois senator that a debate as to the phrasing of the qualifications clause in the constitution arose in the convention that
framed it, and to meet the serious objecion that "it was impossible to make a complete list of qualifications, and that a partial
list might by implication tie the hands of Congress," the section
was finally phrased negitavely so that it would not preclude each
house from exercising its plenary power to pass upon the qualifications of its members.
In the records of the Constitutional Convention, we find the
words of Mr. Wilson: "Besides, a partial enumeration of cases
will disable the legislature from disqualifying odious and dangerous characters. It would be best, on the whole, to let the section
go out; this particular would constructively exclude every other
power of regulating qualifications". And, as a result, the final
draft of the qualifications section was worded negatively, viz.,
"no person shall be a senator who shall not have-".
And, yet, we cannot say that it was the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to have the word" qualifications" in
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Section 5 either restricted to the three essentials expressed in
Section 3, or broadened to such an extent as would confer the
Senate the power to reject or exclude a member or one presenting his credentials for acceptance. The line must be drawn
somewhere, and it is reasonable to suppose that the power given
to the Senate to expel a member, with the concurrence of twothirds, could be exercised where the Senator-elect did not fulfill
other additional qualifications.
The distinction, however, is that the Senate in this case established the precedent of absolutely refusing to allow Senatordesignate Smith to be seated, whereas in other cases the man
in question has been seated as the representative of his state, his
qualifications investigated, and his exclusion voted upon.
In upholding the right of Senator-designate Smith to be
seated in the Senate as the representative of the sovereign State
of Illinois, James M. Beck, former solicitor general of the United
States, and of counsel for the Illinois senator, argued: "If the
Senate has the power to keep Smith and Vare out, it could reject
a Senator for any reason whatever. Who can tell what waves of
class or political feeling may hereafter arise in the turbid stream
of American political life? If the Ku Klux Klan spirit should
ever get control of the Senate and religious feeling again run
high, why might not a Protestant majority in the Senate exclude
a Catholic on the same theory? Suppose that the Senate were
dominated by radicals, might not they hold that any SenatorElect who had been the president of a business corporation, or a
banker, or a railroad president, was, by reason of his economic
ties, quite unfit to be a Senator?"
This argument was answered by Senator Norris of Nebraska
with the conclusion that the same reasoning would apply to the
Supreme Court. '"The truth is", he said, "it is a physical impossibility to confer power upon any body of men without at the
same time conferring upon them the right to abuse that power".
We seek no better affirmation of this principle than that of Chief
Justice Taney, who, in answer to an argument that the powers
of the president were apt to be abused, stated: "All power may
be abused if placed in unworthy hands" (Luther v. Borden, 12
L. Ed. 581.)
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Justice Story has been quoted as having said: "It would
seem but fair reasoning upon the plainest principles of interpretation that when the Constitution established certain qualifications as necessary for office it meant to exclude all others as
prerequisites. From the very nature of such a provision the
affirmation of these qualifications would seem to imply a negative of all others".
In the course of the Senatorial debate, three prominent were
quoted as to their views on the question of qualifications of legislators:
THROOP on PUBLIC OFFICERS*** "The general rule is
that the legislature has the full power to prescribe qualifications
for holding office in addition to those prescribed by the Constitution, if any, provided that they are reasonable and not opposed
to the Constitution provisions or to the spirit of he Constitution".
CUSHNG on CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*** "To the disqualifications of this kind may be added those which may result
from the commission of some crime which would render the
member ineligible.
BURGESS on CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*** "I think it
is safe to say that either House might reject an insane person or
might exclude a grossly immoral person".
Senator Walsh, Montana, after pointing out that the Senate
the
one hand, could not even exclude a murderer, or any
on
criminal and, on the other, could exclude a man because of his
politics, religion, or business, reached this conclusion: "But we
are obliged to choose either the one or the other construction of
the Constitution, and to safeguard the institutions of the country"
And, certainly, we are not willing to choose that construction
that will confer upon the Senate the power to nullify and render
eneffective the act of the people of any of the sovereign states
in the selection of their representatives to Congress. We must
choose that course that "seems to us most accurately to carry
out the intent of the framers of he Constiution, and to safeguard
the institutions", and the ideals of the government of these
United States.
An argument many times resorted to by the opponents to
the seating of the Illinois solon was the one based upon, what
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was claimed to be, the natural right of any legislative body to
keep itself clean, as stated by Senator Ashurst in these words:
"The Senate has the power to employ its constitutional and inherent power and right to keep itself clean". It was held, in the
case of Truman H. Newberry of Michigan, that the excessive expenditures in his campaign for the senatorial seat were "contrary
to sound public policy, harrful to the honor. aid dignity of the
Senate, and dangerous to the perpetuity of a free government."
Senator James Reed reasoned that "if the Senate does not
have the right to protect its own integriy, then there is no power
outside the Senate to protect that integrity."
1872 President Grant, commenting upon the refusal to seat
a congressman as the duly elected representative of his own
state, made this observation: "If refused admission as a member
for want of due allegiance to the Government and returned to
his constituents, they are admonished that none but persons loyal
to the United States will be allowed a voice in the legislative
councils of the nation, and the political power and moral influence
of Congress are thus effectively exerted in the interest of loyalty
to the Government of the United States and fidelity to the
Union."
Representative Burrows in unseating Representative Cannon
in 1880 made this statement: "But it will be observed that the
tonstitution does not undertake to specify those things which
disqualify a person for membership. The doctrine is well settled
that to entitle a person to a seat in this House he must not only
possess those affirmative qualifications mentioned in the Constitution, to wit, residence, citizenship, and age, but he must be
free from those things which by common parliamentary law
disqualify."
Senators who championed the right of the Senate to keep
itself clean, to keep its membership at the highest possible standard, and to protect its own integrity and honor, seized upon this
principle as the basis of their contention that the credenials of
Senator Smith should not be accepted. To these men, the excessive expenditure in the interest of the successful candidate
and the acceptance by him, as the former commerce commissioner of Illinois, of large contributions to his campaign fund by
the public utilities magnates and corporations, whose interests
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were alleged to have been served by Smifh in that capacity, was
such a repugnant and improper practice as would serve to disqualify the candidate elected to any legislative body in the world.
Time and again it was asserted on the floor of the Senate that
there was never a legislative body in any form of government
in any country in the world that did not have the right to protect
its own integrity and reputation by passing upon the qualifications of its own members, except where expressly restricted by
written Constitution.
The Senate would not be denied by any reasonable person
its right to protect itself from men whose presence in its august
body would tend to destroy its integrity ,its honor, and whatever
remains of what was once very high public esteem, but such
right is retricted by and subject to the prior rights of the sovereign states.
In answerto the argument of Senator Reed to the effect that
no agency but the senate itself could protect its integrity, The
New York World said editorially: "By 'protect it own integrity', Mr. Reed means that the senate shall impose its standards
of integrity upon the state of Illinois. In his opinion, a majority
of the electorate of any state whatever qualifications are deemed
necessary to protect the integrity of the senate. If this doctrine
prevails, then the majority of the senate can of its own will, reviewable nowhere else, strup any qualifications it likes. The
right of a state to representation becomes limited by the arbritary will of 49 senators".
To comment further upon the effect of senatorially imposed
qualifications would tend to weaken the effect of the above
quoted words. The result may be plainly seen and should be
carefully avoided. We cannot sacrifice fundamental state rights
upon the altar of the senate, that its own integrity may be kept
un-sullied by the slightest taint of impropriety. "Eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty", but the price of senatorial integrity is not, and must never be, the sacrifice of state rights.
But is there a question of state rights involved in a consideration of this question? Senator McKellar, opposing th6
seating of Senator Smith, claimed that the right of the sovereign
State of Illinois were not involved. He said: "It is claimed for
Smith that a question of state rights is at issue. I see no ques-
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tion of state rights at all in this matter. The Senate is not refusing the State of Illinois its equal representation in the Senate.
If Smith were 20 years old and presented. credentials otherwise
regular, he would be excluded, and it would be no deprivation of
state rights. The Governor of Illinois does not have to appoint
Smith to fill the vacancy. He can appoint any other quallified
citizen of Illinois, man or woman, and the Senate will receive
him or her."
If Senator Smith had been 20 years of age, his credentials
would have been prima facia void, because he, as a duly elected
senator of Illinois, would fail to meet one of the three affirmative
qualifications stated in the Constitution. But, if we conclude
that the Senate has the right only to consider the qualifications
of age, residence, and citizenship of a senator-elect of or designate, then we are denying no right vested in a sovereign state,
because the constitutional provision .stating the essential qualifications of the representative of a sovereign state were accepted by
the state delegates in the Constitutional Convention.
In Article V of the Constitution, there is the provision that,
"-no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate." What could have constituted a deprivation of the right of Illinois to equal suffrage in the Senate more
than this refusal to seat its duly elected and qualified representative? What could be more conclusive as to the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to protect the sacred right to
equal suffrage in the Senate for all 'states than the fact that this
article was, not amensable?
That Illinois was deprived of her equal suffrage in the Senate is clear from the fact that the entire short session passed
without Senator Smith being seated. .Illinois has had but one
Senator representing her during that time to speak the will of the
people on many important measures that confronted the Senate.
Was this not a clear violation of state rights?
Our government was a new contribution to the political
science of the world. It was based upon a new principle-the
dual form of government. It combined the colonies into an
"indestructible Union of indestructible states" each supreme in
its own domain. Senator Bingham in a very eloquent address
during the Smith hearing on this point said: "Aristotle described
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all the forms of government that were known to the ancients,-monarchy, democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy,--and state the difficulties to be found and to be met with in those different forms
of government. At that time no one had thought of a representative form of government. We on the other hand, have found
our prosperity in a representative system of government, and in
a new principle of government dividing the powers between a
central government-those powers necessary for the national defense-and the local or State governments, who look after their
own affairs. It is now proposed to deny to a sovereign state of
the Union the right to have an ambassador whom she sends here,
with credentials which are not questioned-as to their authenticity or as to their regularity, to take the oath and to be received
as an ambassador from the state of Illinois-."
On 'the question of sovereignty and state rights, Senator
Fess made the following remarks: "Ours is a peculiar system
of government. Our government is the only one in the history
of the world that represents the double sovereignty, in which
there is the sovereignty of the Nation, and the sovereignty of the
State. The sovereignty of the State is just as exacting and just
as precious, within the limits in which it is sovereign, as is the
sovereignty of the federal government within the limits of its
sovereignty."
Shall we, then, allow a mere majority or even two-thirds
of the Senate to say to the sovereign state of Illinois: We will
not accept Frank L. Smith as the Senator-designate of your state.
Your governor must either appoint another person, or the people
of your state musf elect another man to represent them in this
body. You cannot be represented by this Senator. of your own
choice. The Senate must protect its own integrity by closing
the door of the Senate upon men whose campaigns are conducted
in such a manner as was the Smith campaign? Shall we suffer
our rights as sovereign states to be subjected to the will of twothirds of the Senate?
Surely, the fathers of our government never harbored in
their minds such a thought as that. Had they foreseen such a
possibility under the Constitution, they would have made express provision against it. Their intention Wvas that it should be
the foundation of a great Union of sovereign states, individually
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sovereign as states, and collectively sovereign as a Union of
states.
We must not allow the passions or popular opinions of the
day to undermine our long-established principles of government
as set forth in the Constitution. In the words of Chief Justice
Taney in a very able opinion in Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393,
"it (the constitution) is not only the same in words, but the same
in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the governmen,
and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the
citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form,
it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning
and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of
its framers and was voted on and adopted by the people of the
United States."
We must keep ever uppermost in our minds the intention,
of our forefathers in the construction of our government, and in
the preparation of the Constitution, and the intention that the
United States should be a nation for the common defense and
protection on the individual states, and that the sovereign states
should be the guardians of the unalienable rights of the people.
In a recent editorial, the New York World observed on this
point: "It has been said that if the nation can trust the Senate
to decide the issues of war and peace, then it can trust the Senate
to decide whether a state has chosen a representative who meets
the proper moral requirements. The answer to this argument is
that this is a Federal Union of States, and that to give to a majority of the Senate the right arbitrary to deprive a State of
representation is to strike at the very root of federalism and of
the autonomy of the States. Great powers are intrusted to the
Senate by the people of the several States, but just because these
powers are so great they should not also intrust to the Senate
the final right to say arbitrarily who shall sit in the Senate. That
is the power of the peoples of the States ought jealously to reserve for themselves."
Article X of the Amendments provides that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Consitution, nor prohibited
to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." And this right to choose their own representatives
in the national legislature is a right reserved for the people.
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Hence, the people of Illinois claim their rights as those guaranteed them by the Constitution and not as a gift of Congress
in general, or of the Senate in particular.
If we are solicitous of the preservation of the rights of' the
sovereign states, our conclusion must be that in its refusal to
accept into its membership the senator of any one of the States,
the Senate of the United States has usurped its granted power.s,
and assumed a right not conferred upon it by nullifying the action of a sovereign state in the selection of its representatives in
the Senate.
And we find ourselves asking these questions: Are the
states being forgotten in the excess of national legislation? Are
the states being forced into the background because so much of
our thought is national? Are.the states being forgotten because
our federal government is becoming more and more paternalistic? A survey of recent legislation by Congress, a study of
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and a consideration of recent governmental actions will indicate that that the
governing tendency toward further centralization of government, toward a more paternalistic national government, toward
a weakening of state sovereignty, has been climaxed by the
Senate's deliberate nullification of the right of the people of a
sovereign state to be represented in Congress by their chosen
Senator.
"If we are a nation," said Senator Bingham in his discussion
of this case, "if we are to be an empire, then the Senate is responsible for the type of man it permits to sit in it. If we are
a Union of the States, then the States are responsible. Deprive
a*state of its responsibility, and you make it merely a province
of the empire of America." What could have been farther from
the minds of our forefathers than to establish here in America
an empire? Had they not left the English Empire because it
stood no longer as a free government for a free people?
The Senate's act has set a dangerous precedent. It has endangered and weakened the sovereignty of the states. It has
denied the people the right to be represented by the Senator of
their choice. It has denied the State of Illinois its equal suffrage
in the Senate. It has placed the preservation of its own integrity
before the preservation of state rights.
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Such a precedent as this, more than the excessive expenditures in any campaign, more than the destruction of the honor
and integrity of the Senate, is dangerous to the perpetuity of a
free government. We cannot permit our government to deviate
from the district paths of procedure laid out for it by the Constitution, else our rights as citizens of sovereign states and a
sovereign Union of States be whittled away to a mere nothing,
and the erosion, constant and increasing as it is, of the federal
Constitution terminate in its destruction.
We must be militant in our efforts to preserve it as the
foundation of our government. "We cannot suffer its principles
to be perverted or abrogated by the passion s or the prejudices
of the times, or of the few. It has remained permanent and
lasting for a century and a half, and we must see that it continues
to stand as a governmental superstructure upon the foundation
of its own great principles. It rests upon us as a duty to make
sure that this guarantee for the protection of our unalienable
rights of life, liberty and property passes to our posterity from
generation to generation as a heritage of a free people. It is
exactly such precedents as thi s that weaken and undermine the"
principles of the Constitution.
And, today, we may repeat with Washington the same words
of warning and advice that he spoke to his fellow contrymen
upon his retirement from service in the interests of his government, words that in this age are as much to be heeded as they
were when spoken: "It is of infinite moment that you should
properly estimate the immense value of your national Union to
your collective and individual happiness. Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present
happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but
also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its
principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effedt, in the forms of the Constitution, alterations that will impair the energy of the sysem, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown".

